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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a voluntary method of alternative dispute resolution that most
frequently is used to settle contract and related disputes, including disputes between private parties arising under statutes. The use of arbitration has been bur* John F. Murray Professor of Law, University of Iowa. The author thanks Christopher R. Drahozal for his comments on the manuscript and Paige Nelson for her research assistance.
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geoning in recent years. In 2002, for example, the American Arbitration Association (AAA), only one of the many providers of arbitration services to disputants,
handled 230,255 cases.' Arbitration,2 however, is controversial when used to settle
employment and consumer disputes.

Critics call such arbitration "mandatory arbitration" because agreements to
arbitrate often are contained in adhesion contracts that, the critics say, leave the
employee or consumer no choice but to agree to arbitration. 3 The critics apparently believe that arbitration provides second-class resolutions of such disputes to
the prejudice of employees and consumers. Many advocate that arbitration should
be banned or limited in these cases, leaving a party free to resort to litigation despite its agreement to arbitrate.4
Many courts appear to be among the critics despite proclamations by the
United States Supreme Court that there is a statutorily-based federal policy favoring arbitration. This policy is applicable throughout the full range of the Commerce Clause, in state and federal courts alike, and preempts contrary state laws.
In many cases, mostly decided since 2000, the critical courts refuse to enforce5

arbitration agreements by finding them unconscionable under state contract law.
They give a wide range of reasons for such a conclusion. The net effect of these
decisions, however, is to provide unprecedented judicial review of arbitration
agreements
for judicially-perceived reasonableness or fairness, not unconscion6
ability.

These courts have gone too far, often failing to follow the applicable law as
enunciated in federal preemption cases by the United States Supreme Court or as
encompassed by state contract law. This article's thesis affirms that there are
1. Am. Arbitration Ass'n., A Brief Overview of the American Arbitration Association,
http://www.adr.org/overview (last visited Oct. 5, 2006).
2. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution Provisions in Adhesion Contracts,
35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 225 (1998); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L.
REV. 449 (1996); Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695;
Samuel Estreicher, PredisputeAgreements To Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1344 (1997); Symposium, Mandatory Arbitration,67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2004); Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute (Mandatory)Arbitration
Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 1069 (1998); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:
Community and Coercion Under the FederalArbitrationAct, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999); Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or Trap for the Weak and
Unwary?, 21 J. CORP. L. 331 (1996).
3. See, e.g., Michael D. Donovan & David A. Searles, PreservingJudicial Recourse for Consumers: How To Combat Overreaching Arbitration Clauses, 10 LOY. CONsUMER L. REV. 269, 278-79
(1998); Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1601-02
(2005); Speidel, supra note 2; Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1632 n.1 (2005).
4. E.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 161-66 (2004).
5. See infra notes 140-222. Instead of relying on the unconscionability doctrine, some courts also
have used other contract law doctrines. E.g., Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d
370, 383-84 (6th Cir. 2005) (mutual assent lacking); Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd.
840 P.2d 1013, 1016-17 (Ariz. 1992) (reasonable expectations under an adhesion contract preclude
enforcement of arbitration agreement); Cheek v. United Healthcare of Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 835 A.2d
656, 661-62 (Md. 2003) (lack of mutuality precludes enforcement of arbitration clause); cf GreenPoint
Credit, LLC v. Reynolds, 151 S.W.3d 868, 875 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004) (reasonable expectations regarding mutuality of exception to arbitration agreement preclude enforcement to the extent not mutual).
6. See infra notes 140-222 and accompanying text.
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cases in which an arbitration agreement should not be enforced because it is unconscionable under generally applicable state contract law. It suggests, however,
that many judicial refusals to enforce are based on clearly erroneous reasons. It is
hard to resist the conclusion that many courts are hostile to arbitration, as were
courts until passage of the United States Arbitration Act in 1925 (generally known
as the Federal Arbitration Act or FAA).8 According to the Supreme Court, the
point of that legislation was to end judicial hostility. 9
Part I of this Article sketches the basics of arbitration law and practice, and
traces the development of the federal policy favoring arbitration, to establish a
basis for evaluating contemporary judicial decisions. Part II examines the justification for the policy favoring arbitration and the reasons contracting parties may
prefer arbitration. Part III evaluates the reasons courts give for finding arbitration
agreements in employment and consumer contexts unconscionable, and therefore,
unenforceable. The conclusion is that many courts make many clearly erroneous
decisions, including decisions that are unconstitutional because they are preempted.
I1. ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE
A. The Arbitration Process
Arbitration is a matter of contract: there can be no valid arbitration without
the disputing parties' agreement. 10 Most often, the parties agree to arbitrate as
part of a "container contract" providing for a substantive exchange and containing
an arbitration clause. These agreements are known as "pre-dispute" arbitration
agreements." When concluding pre-dispute agreements, however, the parties-or
at least the weaker party-may not think about the kinds of disputes that may arise
or the procedures to be employed to settle them. For employees and consumers,
even reading a pre-dispute arbitration clause-which is rare-may not produce

7. One court wrote: "The reality that the average consumer frequently loses his/her constitutional
rights and right of access to the court when he/she buys a car, household appliance, insurance policy,
receives medical attention or gets a job rises as a putrid odor which is overwhelming to the body politic." Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999).
8. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
9. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v.Randolph, 531 U.S.79 (2000); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd.of Trs.
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989). Counterpart state legislation has the same
effect. For example, the precursor to the Federal Arbitration Act was an arbitration statute enacted in
New York in 1920. New York Arbitration Law, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803 (codified as amended at
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7501 (McKinney 1998)), cited in Mark Berger, Arbitration and Arbitrability: Toward
an Expectation Model, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 753, 755 n.7 (2004). See REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION
Acr (2000).
10. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).

11. Occasionally, the parties conclude a stand-alone arbitration agreement after a dispute has arisen.
These agreements are known as "submission" agreements or "post-dispute" agreements. Almost no
one criticizes post-dispute agreements because they are concluded with awareness of the nature of the
dispute and of the relevant arbitration process. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The Revocability of ContractProvisions Controlling Resolution of Future Disputes Between the Parties,67 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 218-20 (2004).
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much understanding. 12 Lawyers representing such parties usually are not involved
at this stage.
In the typical cases considered for this Article, a dispute arises between an
employee or consumer, on one hand, and an employer or retail seller, on the other.
The weaker party-one of the former-is the one aggrieved by an alleged breach
of contract or a violation of a statute applicable in a contractual relationship. The
weaker party files a lawsuit in a court. At least in federal court, the stronger party
files motions under the FAA to compel arbitration and to stay litigation.' 3 Following argument, and a factual hearing in some cases, the court denies these motions,
thereby refusing to enforce the arbitration agreement. A lawsuit presumably follows.
When a court enforces the arbitration agreement, or the parties do not contest
its validity, the claimant may file a "demand" for arbitration, in most cases with an
arbitration services provider such as the AAA, as set forth in the agreement and
the service provider's rules. 14 The respondent will receive a copy of the demand
and file an answer.1 5 The parties will proceed to select their arbitrator or arbitrators, who need not be lawyers but may be experts in the relevant field. 16 If the
parties cannot agree, the service provider or a court will appoint the arbitrator. 7
The arbitrator, after hearing the parties, will adopt a procedure for the arbitration,
in accordance with the arbitration agreement. In a case with large stakes, he or
she may decide upon requests from the parties, require discovery as appears appropriate in the case, receive pretrial summaries of the parties' cases, and conduct
a hearing on the merits. 18 Following the hearing, the arbitrator may or may not
receive post-hearing submissions. He or she will decide the case and issue an
award. A victorious party can move a court to confirm the award and enter it as a
judgment of the court. 19 It then must be recognized and enforced to the same
extent as would be a judicial judgment. In all cases, the arbitration is governed
primarily by the arbitration agreement and any arbitration rules incorporated
therein. The costs of the arbitration, including the arbitrator's fee, are borne by
20
the parties, as agreed in the arbitration agreement or as the arbitrator may decide.
Arbitrations vary greatly from one to another. When the stakes are small, the
arbitration can be brief and simple, taking only a few hours, by telephone or in
12. Id.
13. 9 U.S.C §§ 3-4 (2000).
14. E.g., Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes, R. C2(a) (effective Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014 (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) [hereinafter AAA Supplementary Procedures]; Am. Arbitration Ass'n, National Rules for the Resolution of
Employment Disputes, R. 4b(i) (effective Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22075 (last
visited Oct. 22, 2006) [hereinafter AAA National Rules].
15. E.g., AAA Supplementary Procedures, supra note 14, at R. C-2(c); AAA National Rules, supra
note 14, at R. 4b(ii).
16. Though arbitration tribunals may consist of one or more arbitrators, this Article will encompass
in "arbitrator," in the singular, tribunals with more than one member.
17. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). E.g., AAA Supplementary Procedures, supra note 14, at R. C-4; AAA
National Rules, supra note 14, at R. 12b.
18. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Commercial Arbitration Rules, R. R-1, R-20 to -35 (effective Sept. 15,
2005), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) [hereinafter AAA Commercial
Arbitration Rules].
19. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-10, 13 (2000).
20. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 18, at R. R-50.
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person, short-circuiting the extensive procedures employed in litigation (outside of
small claims court). Even when the stakes are large, the arbitration will be tailored to the dispute. Generally speaking, claims will not be dismissed nor summary judgment granted prior to a hearing on the merits. There may be little or no
discovery, or discovery may be limited to documents only. A hearing 2on the mer'
its dispenses with the rules of evidence. There is no jury in arbitration.
If something goes seriously wrong in the arbitration process, there is a judicial remedy. Courts may be called on to confirm an award.22 The losing party
23
may seek to vacate the award. The FAA specifies the grounds for vacating an
award. They are:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.24
In some jurisdictions, an award may be vacated, in addition, when the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. Vacating an award, however, is unusual; it is
not the result of a robust appeal.
B. The Old JudicialHostility
Recourse to arbitration was common in medieval England and seems to have
been favored by the courts. In 1608, however, Lord Coke's influential dictum in
Vynior's Case 26 began a trend toward judicial disfavor, at least with respect to the
enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements. In that case, Robert Vynior
brought an action in debt against William Wilde on a bond of twenty pounds.
Wilde's commitment under the bond was to observe and perform the arbitral
award of a named arbitrator who had the authority by the parties' agreement "to
21. It has long been held that, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party implicitly waives its right to a jury
trial. Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1187 (Cal. 1976). See generally Stephen J.
Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional
Rights, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (2004).
22. 9 U.S.C. § 9.
23. Id. § 10.
24. Id.
25. E.g., Goldman v. Architectural Iron Co., 306 F.3d 1214, 1216 (2d Cir. 2002); see First Options
of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-43 (1995).
26. 8 Co. Rep. 80a.
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rule, order, adjudge, arbitrate, and finally determine all Matters, Suits, Controversies, Debates, Griefs and Contentions" as described. Coke gave judgment on the
bond for Vynior, but in dicta observed that a party could countermand his obligation to arbitrate. He reasoned, oddly, that to decide otherwise would be to make
"not countermandable, which is by the law and of its own nature countermandable., 27 He also analogized the arbitration agreement to powers of attorney or the
provisions of a last will and testament, which were and are revocable.
Hostility to arbitration agreements evolved from Vynior's Case into a contest
between arbitration and the judiciary. In 1749, a plaintiff brought an action on an
insurance policy, and the defendant defended on the basis of the arbitration clause
in the policy. The court gave judgment for the plaintiff because "the agreement of
the parties [to arbitrate] cannot oust this court" of jurisdiction.28 The idea that an
agreement to arbitrate ousts the courts of jurisdiction was influential in England
until the Arbitration Act of 1889.29 That act provided that a submission, unless it
expressed a contrary intention, was irrevocable and had the same effect as if made
by court order. It also made the first stab at rules of law which would facilitate the
conduct of an arbitration, such as the appointment of arbitrators when the parties
failed to do so, empowering arbitrators to summon witnesses and examine them
under oath, making awards final, and empowering arbitrators to award costs. In
England, then, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements, but it had largely evaporated by the turn of the twentieth
century.
The history in England had a large effect on nineteenth century judicial attitudes toward arbitration in the United States. Before 1920, United States courts
tended to enforce arbitral awards rendered before a judicial proceeding was com30
menced unless the arbitration was a product of collusion to defraud a third party.
Agreements to arbitrate, however, were another matter. Nineteenth century courts
"simply assumed that such clauses were revocable and non-enforceable., 31 Thus,
in 1874, the Supreme Court announced a principle of the non-enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate future disputes. "Every citizen," the Court wrote, "is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and to invoke the protection which all
the laws or all those courts may afford him.",32 In a civil case, a party "may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration, or to the decision of a
single judge," but a party "cannot ...bind himself in advance by an agreement,
which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all

27. Id. at 81b-82a. (Coke's reports at 302-304).
28. Kill v. Hollister, 18 Geo. 2, 1 Wils 129, quoted in Robert B. von Mehren, From Vynior's Case to
Mitsubishi: The Future of Arbitrationand Public Law, 477 PRAC. L. INST./COM. 177, 182 (1988).
29. von Mehren, supra note 28, at 183 (referring to the Arbitration Act of 1889, 52 and 53 Vict., ch.
49).
30. Id. at 185 (citing Karthaus v. Yllas y Ferrer, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 222, 228 (1828); Houseman v.
Cargo of the Schooner N.C., 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 40 (1841)).
31. Id. at 185-86; see Tobey v. County of Blistol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313, 1321-23 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).
32. Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445,451 (1874).
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occasions." 33 The precedents, the Court reasoned, show that "agreements in advoid., 34
vance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and
C. Advent of the Policy FavoringArbitration
Statutory reforms, first in New York and then at the federal level, radically
changed the law governing the enforceability of arbitration agreements. In New
York, a group of reformers sought to ease the judiciary's caseload burden by fostering arbitration. In 1923, a leader of the reform movement stated its goals as
follows:
1. To reduce the cost to the consumer, without taking it out of the producer.
2. To reduce the law's delay and consequently what amounts virtually to
a denial of justice.
3. To save time, trouble and money to disputants, the law office, and the
state.
4. To preserve business friendships.
5. [Arbitration] is voluntary. No one need agree to arbitrate unless it is
his wish.35
To accomplish these goals, the reformers sought foremost to reverse the rule
holding arbitration agreements "revocable." The 1920 New York arbitration statute provided that a written contract to settle an existing or future dispute was
"valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract. 3 6 Courts were authorized to make or37
ders directing arbitration to proceed as provided in the contract or submission
and to appoint arbitrators if the parties failed to do so.38 Moreover, 39the courts
could stay litigation that was inconsistent with an arbitration agreement.
The reformers proceeded to campaign for reform on the federal level. In
1925, Congress enacted the FAA.40 Like the New York statute, the FAA mandates the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements "save upon such
33. Id. at 451.
34. Id. at 452. For a different view, see Bruce L. Benson, An Explorationf the Impact of Modern
ArbitrationStatutes on the Developmentof Arbitration in the United States, 1IJ.L. ECON. & ORG. 479
(1995).
35. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 29-30 (1992) (citing Charles Bernheimer's introduction to Appendix B of the
A.B.A. Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law's 1924 report).
36. New York Arbitration Act, ch. 275, § 2, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803, 804.
37. Id. § 3.
38. Id. § 4, 1920 N.Y. Laws at 805.
39. Id. § 5.
40. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000)).
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grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.,'4

Courts

can stay judicial proceedings and compel arbitration. 42 Courts can appoint arbitrators when necessary.43 Motions for stays or to compel litigation are made and
heard as motions, 4" obviating the need for complaints or other court filings. Arbitrators are empowered to issue subpoenas for evidence from parties and nonparties
alike.45 Courts were empowered to4 6confirm valid awards or vacate awards that
were infirm by the statutory criteria.
Even so, the old judicial hostility persisted. In Wilko v. Swan,47 in 1953, the
Supreme Court found that arbitration was substantive in its implications because it
was an inferior form of dispute resolution for important substantive claims. Wilko
was overruled in this regard in 1989.48
The beginning of the Supreme Court's shift was in 1967. In Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,49 the Court eliminated any powerful judicial
role in supervising arbitration agreements. The claim was one of fraud in the
inducement of a contract containing an agreement to arbitrate disputes that arose
out of, or related to, the contract or a breach thereof. The issue before the Court
was whether a claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract should be
resolved by the court in which a stay of litigation is sought, or, rather, should be
referred to the arbitrators.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had taken the view that, as a
matter of federal substantive law, arbitration clauses are "separable" from the
contracts in which they are embedded; hence, when no claim was made that fraud
was directed to the arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration clause would commit the question of fraud in the container contract to the arbitrators.50 The Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit, by contrast, had taken the view that the question
of "severability" should be decided as a matter of state law; where a state regards
arbitration clauses as inseparable from the remainder of the agreement, the question of fraud would be for the courts. 51 The Second Circuit's view was upheld.
The FAA, as interpreted, deprived the courts of a device that otherwise could be
used to keep cases away from arbitrators.
Any doubt that the Supreme Court's attitude had changed became difficult to
maintain after three decisions in the 1980s. In Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp.,52 the Court announced that there was a federal policy
favoring arbitration. The issue involved arbitrability, this time a claim that one
party to an arbitration agreement had "lost any right to arbitration under the contract due to waiver, laches, estoppel, and failure to make a timely demand for
41. New York Arbitration Act, ch. 275, § 2, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803, 804.
42. Id. §§ 3-4; 43 Stat. at 883-84.
43. New York Arbitration Act, ch. 275, § 5; 43 Stat. at 884.
44. New York Arbitration Act, ch. 275, § 6.
45. Id. § 7.
46. Id. §§ 9-10; 43 Stat. at 885.
47. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
48. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479-83 (1989).
49. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
50. Id. at 402.
51. Id. at 402-03 (citing Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915,923-24 (1st Cir.
1960)).
52. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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arbitration., 53 First, the Court read Prima Paint to manifest a policy of the FAA
to require "a liberal reading of arbitration agreements" so that, for example, "some
54
issues that might be thought relevant to arbitrability are themselves arbitrable."
Second, it announced that
[q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration. .

.

. The Arbitration Act estab-

lishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an
55
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.
Then, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,56 the Court wrote that, in enacting the
FAA, "Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration [for disputes
within the Commerce Clause] and withdrew the power of the states to require a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration. 57 In 1985, the court decided Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc,58 which involved the arbitrability of antitrust claims
advanced under the Sherman Act and within a valid arbitration clause in an international contract. The court of appeals had reasoned that "the pervasive public
interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the nature of the claims that arise
in such cases, combine to make ...

antitrust claims ...

inappropriate for arbitra-

tion."' 59 The Court found no "explicit" support for such an exception in either the
Sherman Act or the FAA. 6° It held that antitrust claims were arbitrable, at least
when arising from an international transaction. Since Mitsubishi, a series of decisions has expanded the realm of arbitrable disputes to encompass
61
62 such statutory
claims as those arising under the federal securities law,' RICO, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 63 and Title VII employment disputes. 64 Following Mitsubishi, the Court appears to assume that, if Congress intended a statute's

53. Id. at 7.
54. Id. at 22 n.27.
55. Id. at 24-25.

56. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
57. Id. at 10.

58. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
59. Id.at 629 (citing Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir.
1968)).
60. Id. at 628-29.
61. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
62. Id. at 242; PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
63. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). An arbitration agreement between
an employer and an employee does not, however, bar the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
from proceeding in court. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 287-88 (2002). According to
the Supreme Court, moreover, an agreement that prevents the effective vindication of statutory rights
may be unenforceable. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000); see
also Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
64. E.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998). Contra Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled by E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward,
Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003).
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substantive protection to include protection from waiving 65a judicial forum, "that
intention will be deducible from text or legislative history."
The policy favoring arbitration should be taken seriously. This policy reaches
by far the lion's share of contractual transactions within the United States, so long
as they affect interstate commerce. 66 The policy preempts inconsistent state
laws. Through section 2 of the FAA, it is applicable in state courts.68 In light of
the burgeoning number of cases brought to arbitration, arbitration might be in the
process of replacing litigation as the primary method of compulsory dispute settlement for contract and related civil cases.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION
A. Justifications
That the Supreme Court adheres to a strong policy favoring arbitration does
not mean that there should be such a policy. One normative reason, however,
supports such a conclusion: 69 it is freedom of contract, premised on the value of
party autonomy. Moreover, the parties may wish to enter an arbitration agreement
for three reasons. First, the parties themselves may wish to balance accuracy of
results, procedural fairness, and adjudicative efficiency differently from the way
the courts do it in civil litigation. The second is arbitration's capacity to serve as
an alternative to a slow and sometimes terrifying civil litigation system. The third
is the value of allowing parties to balance accuracy of results against the finality
of decisions, also doing it differently from the way the courts do it. On the whole,
it should be concluded, the Supreme Court's policy is reasonable.
1. Freedom of Contract:Party Autonomy
In principle, allowing contract parties to agree to settle disputes by arbitration
enhances party autonomy. It expands freedom of contract by allowing parties to
contract for an arbitral forum, thus making litigation merely a default method of

65. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628. Congress has made pre-dispute arbitration agreements in motor vehicle franchise agreements unenforceable. 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2002).
66. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 482, 489 (1987). Contracts of employment for transportation workers are excluded by the FAA. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
67. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 281; Perry, 482 U.S. at 490-91;
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); Christopher R. Drahozal, FederalArbitration Act
Preemption,79 IND. L.J. 393, 425 (2004).
68. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12.
69. Supporters of arbitration often tout the privacy of arbitration proceedings and the secrecy of
most awards, which in domestic cases generally do not give reasons anyway, as a virtue of arbitration.
Surely many parties prefer privacy, and for them this is an advantage when choosing whether to agree
to arbitrate. Privacy is not, however, a reason supporting the policy favoring arbitration. Privacy and
the secrecy of awards hamper the further development of the law because arbitration sets no precedents. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-89 (1984). The general secrecy of awards is a drawback to the policy favoring arbitration, especially in arbitration of statutory
claims, such as employment discrimination claims.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2006/iss2/4

10

Burton: Burton: New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration
No. 2]

The New JudicialHostility to Arbitration

settling disputes. 70 With an arbitration alternative, parties are not faced with a
"choice" between litigation and simply yielding (insofar as compulsory methods
of dispute resolution are concerned). Instead, parties can choose among litigation,
arbitration, or yielding. By contrast with litigation, moreover, arbitration is highly
flexible. The parties can fashion the procedure as best suits their needs. Hence,
arbitration empowers people to better control their own destinies.
Most of the cases reviewed herein involve adhesion contracts containing arbitration clauses. Adhesion contracts are standard form contracts drafted and "imposed" by a strong party on another with less bargaining power. Negotiations
over the pre-printed terms-those that are not added to the form, in contrast to
items such as the price term-are not allowed. The weaker party rarely reads or
understands the pre-printed terms. 7' Sometimes, important terms are in fine print
or obscure language that discourages understanding.72 Adhesion contracts are
ubiquitous in the American economy. One scholar suggests that ninety-nine
per73
cent of contracts entered into in the United States are adhesion contracts.
It has been argued that the party autonomy rationale does not reach adhesion
contracts. 74 The weaker party generally cannot negotiate the pre-printed terms.
Assent to the arbitration clause is not subjectively present because that party normally does not read or understand those terms.75 For practical purposes, however,
the general scholarly debate on adhesion contracts is beside the point. Under the
Supreme Court's arbitration decisions, adhesion contracts containing arbitration
clauses cannot be treated differently from adhesion contracts generally.76 Because
adhesion contracts, including the fine print, generally are enforced, 77 the arbitration clauses must be enforced unless they are unenforceable for other reasons.
As a normative matter, moreover, it can be argued that adhesion contracts
generally should be enforced. One reason is that, it has been suggested, the relevant subjective assent is present because the weaker party signs the form contract
normally knowing that there are terms in it that they do not understand. Those
parties nonetheless intend to be bound by all of the terms of the contract. 78 Indeed, it would be unreasonable and unworkable to require that each party subjectively assent to each term in a (perhaps) long form contract. In part for the same
reason, moreover, a reasonable person in the stronger party's position would un70. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rulesfrom MandatoryRules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration,83
MiNN. L. REV. 703 (1999).
71. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contractsof Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction,
96 HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983).
72. 1 E.ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26 (3d ed. 2001).
73. W. David Slawson, StandardForm Contractsand Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power,84
HARv. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971).
74. Rakoff, supra note 71, at 1180, 1183-90.
75. See, e.g., Carrington & Castle, supra note 12, at 218-20; Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R.
Hensler, "Volunteering" To Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 55, 73-74 (2004). See generally Alan M. White &
Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 233 (2002).
76. Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
77. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
78. See Merit Music Serv., Inc. v. Sonnebom, 225 A.2d 470, 474 (Md. 1967) ("[Tjhe law presumes
that a person knows the contents of a document that he executes and understands at least the literal
meaning of its terms.").
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derstand that the weaker party assented to the contract and that all of the terms
bind both parties. According to the objective theory of contract, the weaker party
therefore is bound.79
There are three further reasons supporting the objective theory in this context.
First, the objective theory generally is employed for other contract formation issues and for purposes of interpretation. 8° It would be incoherent to employ the
subjective theory only for adhesion contracts or adhesion contracts containing
arbitration agreements. Second, the objective theory protects the stronger party's
reliance interest, as does modem contract law. 81 Third, as has long been understood, there are many good reasons for the stronger party to employ form contracts and to refuse to negotiate the pre-printed terms. Form contracts are, in a
word, efficient. 82 There is reason to believe that arbitration clauses lower the
contract price of the goods, services, or money, or provide weaker parties with
more advantageous
terms, because arbitration reduces the parties' joint costs of
83
contracting.
2. ProceduralFairness,Efficiency, and Accuracy
In a throwback to Wilko v. Swan, 84 the principal concern of contemporary
courts seems to be that a weaker party's contract or related rights may not be effectively vindicated in an arbitration proceeding. 85 (We should assume that this
attitude does not reflect a pro-employee, pro-consumer, or pro-claimant bias because that would be indefensible when structuring procedures.) There is, however, no evidence that arbitration is worse than litigation at achieving accuracy of
results. What little empirical work has been done suggests that arbitrators decide
cases much as judges do, and with less cognitive distortion than juries suffer
86
from.
some partsbut
of the
might beand
moreirrelevant.
pro-employee
and pro87
consumerJuries
than inarbitrators,
thiscountry
is speculative
Arbitration

79. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 627 (2002); Joseph
M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69
FORDHAM L.REv. 427 (2000).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 2, 20, 24, 201(2) (1981).

81. Id. §§ 87(1), 90.
82. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, StandardForm Contracts,and Unconscionability,70 U.
Cmn. L. REv. 1203, 1208-25 (2003).
83. Id. at 1275-76; Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process:Judicial Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 89 (2001). But see Jean R. Stemlight & Elizabeth J.
Jensen, Using Arbitration To Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or UnconscionableAbuse?, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 93 (2004) (criticizing Ware).
84. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
85. The Supreme Court limits the relevant rights to "statutory rights" involving a public interest.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991). See Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787, 795 (2005) (illustrating the California Supreme
Court's similar view).
86. Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 67 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 105, 107 (2004). It is a popular conjecture that arbitrators often make compromise awards
rather than determining the parties' rights and duties, but there is no empirical support for this. Id. at
115-16.
87. See id. at 116-18. After reviewing the available empirical data, Professors Sherwyn, Estreicher,
and Heise concluded that "plaintiffs do not fare significantly better in litigation, that arbitration provides a quicker resolution than litigation, and that available data do not indicate whether damages are
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might in fact be more effective than litigation at achieving accuracy of results.
There are normally no pretrial substantive motions, discovery wars, antiquated
rules of evidence or juries allowing clever advocates to skew the results. In addition, even when operating at its best, the civil litigation system must be assumed
to reach inaccurate results in some cases.
Even if there is not greater accuracy of results in arbitration, the parties
should be empowered to trade off their interests in procedural fairness and efficiency, on one hand, and accuracy of results, on the other, by streamlining and
tailoring their procedure to the needs of the case. Typically, there is no practice
involving delays due to motions to dismiss, summary judgments, and directed
verdicts. Rather, proceedings tend to go directly to a hearing on the merits. Consequently, arbitration is often quicker and cheaper for the parties than litigation,
even after the costs and fees are taken into account. 88 (Of course, arbitration can
go wrong, and can be even slower and more expensive than litigation.)
The civil litigation system has a one-size-fits-all procedure, in each jurisdiction (except in small claims courts), embodied in generally applicable procedural
rules. It balances these policies in one way, sacrificing procedural fairness and
accuracy in some cases in the name of judicial efficiency. For example, consider
the availability of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.89 At this stage, a
court must balance a plaintiff's interest in his or her day in court against judicial
efficiency. It is inefficient to spend resources on meritless claims. However,
some dismissals will be mistakes, and everyone knows it. The litigation system is
prepared to sacrifice some degree of accuracy in the interests of fairness to the
defendant and judicial efficiency. The parties should be able to tailor their procedure to their case, balancing procedural fairness, efficiency, and accuracy of results differently from the way the litigation system does it. Because there are no
pre-hearing dismissals or extensive discovery, arbitration may be capable of doing
a better job at balancing these values in the parties' interests.
Commercial parties very often find arbitration sufficiently fair, efficient and
accurate. They commonly contract out of litigation by concluding arbitration
agreements. 9° Almost no one criticizes the arbitration alternative for commercial
cases. 91 By analogy and inference from the commercial practice, there is no reason to presume that arbitration practice is too unfair, inefficient, or inaccurate for
noncommercial parties.
fairer under either system." David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Casefor Employment Arbitration:A
New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1557, 1564 (2005).' In one recent study, for
example, female employees prevailed in arbitration much more often than similarly-situated women in
litigation, though the amounts of the awards were lower. See Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Something
for Nothing: When Women Prevailin Employment ArbitrationAwards, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 573

(2005).
88. On costs in particular, see Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and ContingentFee Contracts, 59 Vanderbilt L.J. 729 (2006); Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard, Affordable Justice Through
Arbitration: A Critique of Public Citizen's Jeremiad on the "Cost of Arbitration," 57-Jan. DISP.
RESOL. J. 8, 10 (2003).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
90. See Joseph T. McLaughlin & Karen M. Crupi-Fitzgerald, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the
CorporateSector, Civil Practice and Litigation Techniques in Federaland State Courts, SF42 A.L.I.A.B.A: 877 (2001); Thomas J. Brewer, The Arbitrability of Antitrust Disputes: Freedom To Contract
for an Alternative Forum, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 91, 92 (1991).

91. For the exception, see Carrington & Castle, supra note 11.
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3. Alternative to a Crippled Civil Litigation System
Not everyone thinks the American litigation system does a good job. Among
the criticisms are those aimed at lengthy delays due to crowded dockets, discovery
wars, arcane rules of evidence, and the obsolescence of jury trials in civil cases.
These features of American litigation, and others, raise the parties' costs so that
many cases are not worth filing and others are not worth defending. Trials, moreover, are becoming far less prevalent as judges
engage in managerial judging and
92
helping the parties to negotiate settlements.
Arbitration generally dispenses with these troublesome features. In particular, hearings are almost always held; arbitrators do not mediate cases. Parties
consequently may be more likely to get a "day in court." For those who want out
of litigation, the arbitration alternative should be available. There still will be
cases in which the costs of arbitration exceed the amount of a claim or otherwise
discourage proceeding. There is every reason to believe that this happens less in
arbitration
than in civil litigation, especially for consumer and employment
93
claims.
Arbitration is especially important in international commercial cases. Foreign
recognition of United States judgments is difficult, in part reflecting other countries' disdain for the American civil litigation system. Their courts and commentators object to the very same features of litigation that arbitration typically dispenses with. It is therefore reasonable for American parties, like so many foreigners, to find litigation unappealing. Because this is reasonable, courts should not
insist that employees, consumers, and their contract partners resort to litigation as
their sole process.
4. Finality of Awards
In practice, courts vacate few arbitral awards. Judicial scrutiny here falls well
short of that involved in judicial appellate practice.94 But the absence of a robust
appeal in arbitration is one of its attractions to many parties. Arbitration law balances the finality of awards against the greater accuracy appeals might generate.
It finds finality to be of greater value.
The civil litigation system, too, balances finality against accuracy. It sometimes finds finality of greater value. Consider, for example, the courts' refusal to
re-litigate a case when asked to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment.95 The
parties should be able to bring themselves under arbitration law's balance by
agreeing to do so. The balance of finality and accuracy in arbitration is reasonable
even if different from that of the civil litigation system. There is nothing sacred
about a right to a robust appeal.
92. See generally Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57
STAN. L. REv. 1255 (2005); Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1982).

93. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial": The Growth and Impact of "Alternative Dispute Resolution," 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843 (2004).
94. The parties, however, might agree to expand the scope of an appeal, and at least one court will
implement their agreement. Gateway Technologies v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993,
996 (6th Cit. 1995).
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, cmts. a & b (1971).
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B. Scope of the Policy FavoringArbitration:FederalPreemption
Consider section 2 of the FAA, the source of the federal policy favoring arbitration:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such 9grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con6
tract.
The Supreme Court has held that the savings clause of this statute requires that
arbitration agreements in transactions affecting interstate commerce
be enforced
97
on an equal footing with other contracts under state contract law.
In five cases, the Court has struck down state laws that discriminated against
arbitration. 98 In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,99 for example, the Alabama legislature had enacted a statute making written, pre-dispute arbitration
agreements invalid and unenforceable. 100 The Court held it unconstitutional because preempted by section 2 of the FAA. In Doctor'sAssociates v. Casarotto,10 1
the Montana legislature had enacted a statute requiring arbitration clauses to be
underlined and on the first page of a contract. Montana's contract law did not
require contract clauses generally to be written this way. °2 The legislation, therefore, treated arbitration agreements less favorably than general contract law
would. The Supreme Court held that the Montana statute was unconstitutional
because it was preempted by section 2 of the FAA.'0 3
The question raised by this Article is whether courts are free, under these
cases and general principle, to find an arbitration agreement unconscionable when
the court's reasons for such a finding disfavor arbitration. On the one hand, the
justification for such a finding is based in general contract law-the unconscionability doctrine. On the other, however, the reasons and consequences may be
incompatible with the federal policy favoring arbitration. Existing case law does
not resolve this tension. The courts should hold that section 2 of the FAA pre-

96. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
97. Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974).
98. In addition to the two cases summarized in the above paragraph, see Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). See also Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 36 Cal. 4th. 148 (Cal. 2005).
99. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
100. ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993).
101. 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996); see First Options of Chi. Inc., v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
102. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(2) (1995).
103. For a California statute that might be similarly preempted, see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7191
(West 2006) (applicable to residential construction contracts). For an argument that residential construction contracts do not affect interstate commerce, see Woolls v. Super. Ct., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426,
437-39 (Ct. App. 2005).
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empts judicial holdings that disfavor arbitration even if the legal basis for the decision is the unconscionability doctrine.
In dicta, the Supreme Court has given conflicting guidance. In Perry v. Thomas,'04 the Court said:
Thus state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if
that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and
enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its
meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does
not comport with this requirement of [§ 2]. A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise
construes nonarbitration agreements under state law. Nor may a court
rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a statelaw holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would
enable the court to effect what we hold today the state legislature cannot. 105
This passage makes it clear that section 2 of the FAA can preempt a judicial
"holding." Moreover, the last sentence of the passage would seem to say that,
even if the legal basis of the judicial holding is the unconscionability doctrine, § 2
nonetheless may preempt a judicial holding if it disfavors arbitration.
Further Supreme Court dictum is more confusing. In Allied-Bruce Terminix,
the court wrote:
In any event, § 2 gives States a method for protecting consumers against
unfair pressure to agree to a contract with an unwanted arbitration provision. States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under
general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration
clause "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.". . . What States may not do is to decide that a contract
is fair enough to enforce all of its basic terms (price, service, credit), but
not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes any such
state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration
clauses on an unequal "footing," directly contrary to the Act's language
and Congress' intent. 106
The first two sentences of this passage say that states may hold arbitration
agreements unconscionable under generally applicable state contract law. The last
two sentences, however, qualify this position significantly. The penultimate sentence says, in effect, that the arbitration clause should be evaluated in the context
of the whole contract. The contract, including its arbitration clause, rises or falls
on the basis of fairness as a unity. This contradicts the second sentence, which

104. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
105. Id. at 492 n.9 (citations omitted).
106. 513 U.S. 265, 281(1995).
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says that states may regulate arbitration clauses, seemingly singling them out for
analysis under the unconscionability doctrine.
Because support can be found for both positions in Supreme Court dicta, we
should consider what, given existing law, the Court should hold if an appropriate
case were before them. Consider a hypothetical case: a state supreme court holds
that all written, pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate are unenforceable because
unconscionable. There is a similarity to, as well as two distinctions between, this
case and Allied-Bruce Terminix. First, the substance of the hypothetical holding is
identical to that of the Alabama statute in Allied-Bruce Terminix. Second, the
decision was made by a court, not a legislature. Perry is clearly correct that a
court should not be able to do what a legislature cannot. A court can undermine
the relevant federal policy as effectively as does a legislature because the consequences are the same. The fact that the hypothetical case involves state law "of
judicial origin" makes no difference. Third, the hypothetical state court based its
decision on a doctrine of general contract law. For the same reason, this should
make no difference. The consequences undermine the relevant federal policy as
effectively as would legislation without a contract law basis. The hypothetical
case cannot be distinguished meaningfully from Allied-Bruce Terminix.
It might be argued that the basis of the hypothetical holding makes a significant difference. The unconscionability doctrine is a doctrine of general contract
law and, it might be argued, falls within the savings clause of section 2 of the
FAA: "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." 1°7 Unconscionability, it might be argued, is a "ground" for the
revocation of any contract. Such a conceptual argument, however, is not persuasive. The statute should not be read to manifest a "strong" federal policy favoring
arbitration, which preempts contrary state laws, but to allow contrary state laws
that rest on a doctrine of contract law. State laws and judicial holdings with contrary consequences for the federal policy should be preempted whatever their legal
garb. The holding in the hypothetical case puts arbitration agreements on an unequal footing with other contracts and should be preempted.
No court has made such a broad holding as that in the above hypothetical
case. Rather, as will be seen in the next Part of this Article, the courts proceed in
a piecemeal fashion, striking arbitration agreements down one case at a time due
to "unconscionable" features of each particular clause. The courts should not be
able to do piecemeal what they could not do in one stroke.
IV. UNCONSCIONABILITY AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
A synthesis of the cases reviewed for this Article indicates that, since 2000,
many courts have been refusing to enforce arbitration agreements. °8 The usual

107. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
108. See also Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and
Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability as a Counterweightto Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO
ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 757 (2004).
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ground for such refusals is unconscionability. 1° 9 These decisions, however, often
misuse the unconscionability doctrine, qualified by the policy favoring arbitration
as required by federal law. 10° They focus on reasonableness or fairness standards.
These are not the unconscionability standards in general contract law. Using these
vague standards results in treating arbitration agreements less favorably than other
contracts, a result that is preempted by the FAA. 111 In addition, the relevant courts
use the civil litigation system as the standard, striking arbitration agreements that
are not equal to it procedurally. 112 This favors litigation over arbitration, depriving parties of the advantages of arbitration and violating the federal policy favorthat there is a new judicial hostiling arbitration. It is hard to resist the conclusion
13
ity to arbitration in noncommercial cases.
A. Unconscionability
Courts may strike down arbitration agreements when they are unconscionable
under general contract law. As a matter of contract law, however, the unconscionability doctrine is not a license for courts to police agreements for reasonableness or fairness. To find a contract or contract provision unconscionable, 11a4
court must find that it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.
Procedural unconscionability consists in an absence of meaningful choice on the
part of a party with grossly weaker bargaining power. 15 Substantive unconscionability consists of a "gross disparity in the values exchanged. ' ' 6 Note that the
tests require gross disparities in the making of the contract and in its substantive
terms. It is sometimes said that the contract or term must be "harsh," "oppressive," and "shock the conscience" to justify a finding of unconscionability. 117
The phrases "harsh," "oppressive," and "shock the conscience" are not synonymous with "unreasonable." Basing an unconscionability determination on the
reasonableness of a contract provision would inject an inappropriate level of judicial interference into the analysis. With a concept as nebulous as "unconscionability" it is important that courts not thrust themselves into the paternalistic role
of intervening to change contractual terms that the parties have agreed to, merely

109. Outside the reported decisions, there is no empirical basis for believing that abuse by the
stronger party is widespread. One empirical study found, to the contrary, that egregious self-dealing
was unusual. See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 75, at 72; see also Drahozal, supranote 2.
110. See infra notes 140-222 and accompanying text.
111. Id.
112. E.g., Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (Ct. App. 2004).
113. See Carbajal v. H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The cry of
'unconscionable!' just repackages the tired assertion that arbitration should be disparaged as second-

class adjudication.").
114. Contra Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Utah
2004) (alone, substantive unconscionability suffices); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d

569, 574 (1998) (same). See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981).
116. Id. cmt. c.
117. Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (Ct. App. 1997).
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because the court believes the terms are unreasonable. The terms must shock the
conscience. 11
The doctrine, moreover, allows the stronger party to show that the contract or
term, even if grossly unfair, is justified by business needs. If so, the term is upheld. "' 9 In addition, an unconscionable term can be severed from the remainder of
the contract if the unconscionability does not pervade the contract. 120 Apart from
the cases involving arbitration agreements, the courts do not often strike down an
agreement or term for being unconscionable.
Finding arbitration agreements unconscionable consequently does not violate
section 2 of the FAA or its policy favoring arbitration per se. An arbitration
agreement that appears not to allow the effective vindication of a claimant's (or
respondent's) rights might appear to be unconscionable per se. But, as indicated
above, it should be up to the parties to decide whether and how to trade off accuracy, on the one hand, and procedural fairness, finality, and efficiency, on the
other. 1 The courts often ignore the latter side of the balance. Moreover, the
cases do not present themselves in such terms. Rather, an arbitration agreement
may have a particular feature or combination of features that contribute(s) to a
court's conclusion that the agreement is unconscionable and unenforceable. For
example, it may be an adhesion contract, limit discovery, or allow the employer to
litigate while the employee must arbitrate. Not every feature that disadvantages a
claimant, however, is a valid reason to hold that the agreement is unconscionable.' 22 That depends on a closer examination of the court's reasoning in the case.
There are three major, additional reasons for closely scrutinizing judicial reasoning in this context. First, as indicated by Doctor's Associates, a finding of
unconscionability must not single out an arbitration clause for different treatment
than that afforded by contract law generally. In contract law, it is rare for a court
to declare an agreement unconscionable simply because of perceived unreasonableness or unfairness. The policy of contractual freedom requires deference to
the parties' value judgments, even when they are not the judgments the judge
would make or approve of. Second, the unconscionability doctrine requires the
courts to consider whether there is a special business need that justifies the questioned provision. 123 When there is, the agreement is not unconscionable. Third, a
court should take into account the policy favoring arbitration when deciding the
unconscionability question. More important, the mere fact that an arbitration
proceeding will differ from litigation is not a legitimate reason for striking down
an arbitration agreement. It is one of the great advantages of arbitration generally
that the parties may simplify and tailor the arbitration proceeding to their case.
The policy favoring arbitration should be given the effect of requiring due respect
for such advantages over litigation.
118. Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797, 809 (Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001); Armendariz v. Found.

Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 770 (2000). See also U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (2004);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); Perillo, supra note 79, at 427
120. Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d

at 773.
121. See supra notes 88, 95 and accompanying text.
122. Of course, a pro-claimant bias would be inappropriate.
123. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (2004); Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 770.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

19

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2006, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 4
JOURNAL OF DISPUTERESOLUTION

[Vol. 2006

Consider a case holding that an arbitration clause is unconscionable because it
lacks "mutuality:"'' 2 4 the employee must arbitrate while the employer may litigate. 125 Such a holding fails for all three reasons. First, it singles out arbitration
for special treatment. If there is consideration, there is no requirement of "mutuality" in contract law generally.' 26 If there were, it would view the contract as127a
whole when deciding the question, not the arbitration provision in isolation.
Second, there may be a special business need that justifies the provision. In employment relationships, for example, the employer may need access to the courts
to obtain a quick preliminary injunction to prevent an employee from divulging
trade secrets or competing in violation of a covenant not to compete. 12 Empanelling an arbitral tribunal would take too long, and the tribunal may not have the
power to issue preliminary injunctions. 29 Third, the policy favoring arbitration
argues against unconscionability in such cases. The inference is irresistible that
such a holding is premised on a belief that the employee is disadvantaged by having to arbitrate while the employer is advantaged because it can litigate, irrespective of the particular features of the arbitration. Supposing that the employee is
thus disadvantaged supposes that arbitration is inferior to litigation. Such a supposition violates the policy favoring arbitration.
B. Armendariz and the Effective Vindication of Statutory Claims
Before turning to an evaluation of judicial decisions finding arbitration
agreements unconscionable, a different issue should be distinguished. In Gilmer
v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,130 the U.S. Supreme Court held that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act' 3' are arbitrable, continuing its

124. Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 770 (Armendariz, requires a "modicum of bilaterality" within
the arbitration clause, which amounts to a requirement of mutuality in the sense of a balance). See also
Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 871 (D. Or. 2002).
125. E.g., Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 770; Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663,
669-70 (Ct. App. 2004); O'Hare v. Mun. Res. Consultants, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 121-25 (Ct. App.
2003); Mercuro v. Super. Ct., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 676-77 (Ct. App. 2002); see Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002). For consumer cases with similar effect, see
Palm Beach Motor Cars Ltd. v. Jeffries, 885 So. 2d 990 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Taylor v. Butler,
142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. 2004).
126. Bischoff v. DirecTV, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Gray v. Conseco, Inc., No.
SA CV 00-322DOC(EEX), 2000 WL 1480273, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTs § 79(c) (1981).
127. Glazer v. Lehman Bros., 394 F.3d 444, 453 (6th Cir. 2005); Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133,
143-44 (Me. 2005). But see Cheek v. United Healthcare of Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 835 A.2d 656, 654-665
(Md. 2003) (lack of mutuality affecting only the arbitration clause renders that clause unenforceable
because it is separable under Prima Paint). Cheek mistakes Prima Paint. That case holds only that
arbitration clauses are separable from container contracts for the purpose of allocating decisionmaking
authority as between courts and arbitrators. Accordingly, it held that fraud in the inducement of a
container contract presented a question for the arbitrators. See supra notes 49-51. It did not hold that
an arbitration clause is separable for purposes of determining whether it is enforceable. Such a holding
would contradict Perry.
128. See Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 443 (Ct. App. 2004); Pitts
v.
Watkins, 905 So. 2d 553, 555 (Miss. 2005).
129. See Oakland Raiders v. National Football League, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, 778-79 (Ct. App. 1999).
130. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
131. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006).
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line of cases holding that claims under statutes are arbitrable.'3 2 It did not hold,
however, that wherever an employee has concluded an arbitration agreement, such
33
claims must be arbitrated regardless of the characteristics of the arbitration.'
Recognizing the public interest in statutory claims, the court indicated that the
arbitration agreement must provide for the "effective vindication of statutory
rights."' 34 It did not state the minimum conditions under which statutory rights
could be effectively vindicated in arbitration.
The California Supreme Court stated such conditions in the leading case of
Armendariz v. FoundationHealth Psychcare Services, Inc.135 Two employees had
brought an action against their employer under California's Fair Employment and
Housing Act. 36 Their contract of employment, however, contained an arbitration
clause. The employer moved to compel arbitration. The court refused to enforce
the "mandatory" arbitration agreement on both effective vindication and unconscionability grounds. With respect to effective vindication, the court stated four
conditions: (1) the arbitrator must be neutral; (2) the arbitration agreement must
provide for adequate discovery; (3) the arbitration agreement must require the
arbitrator to make a written award to permit a limited form of judicial review; and
(4) the employer must bear the costs of the arbitration
insofar as they have no
137
parallel in litigation (such as the arbitrator's fee).
Gilmer's and Armendariz's effective vindication rationale, it should be emphasized, is applicable only to arbitration of statutory claims.' 38 It has its basis 139
in
the policy of the statute under which the claim is brought, not contract law.
Unconscionability is a matter of contract law and forms a separate basis for invalidating an arbitration agreement. This Article is concerned only with unconscionability. Nonetheless, as in Armendariz, many courts employ the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. This Article
takes these cases into account in the following evaluation. Because of the separate
effective vindication rationale for statutory cases, an agreement to arbitrate a
statutory claim should be held unconscionable under contract law only if the same
agreement to arbitrate a common law claim also would be unconscionable.
C. Judicial Treatment ofArbitrationAgreements
As indicated, many courts are striking down pre-dispute arbitration agreements in noncommercial cases on the ground that they are unconscionable. They
find these agreements procedurally unconscionable simply because they are parts
of adhesion contracts: A stronger party presents them to a weaker party in a standard form contract on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, not allowing negotiations over the
arbitration term. They find such agreements substantively unconscionable for a
132. See supra notes 61-64.
133. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (interpreting Gilmer).
134. Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 916, 923 (M.D. Tenn. 2003)
(citing the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Gilmer in Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211
F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000)).
135. 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Ct. App. 2000).
136. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 2005).
137. Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750.

138. Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 30 Cal. Rptr.3d 787, 796-97 (2005).
139. Cole, 105 F.3d 1465, at 1482-83.
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host of reasons. Few of these reasons, however, hold up under close scrutiny,
though there are cases in which a finding of unconscionability is justified. From
this, one may easily infer that there is a new hostility to arbitration.
1. Procedural Unconscionability
Many arbitration agreements contained in adhesion contracts will be found in
contracts between stronger and weaker parties. Such contracts are generally enforceable. 140 "[T]here is a central theme that runs through the [law]: contracts of
14
adhesion, like negotiated contracts, are prima facie enforceable as written."' '
Respected scholars criticize this law. They advocate, for example, that contracts
of adhesion be considered prima facie unenforceable and reviewable for fairness. 14 2 Notably, many courts have adopted substantially the scholar's view in
recent cases involving arbitration agreements. These courts hold that adhesion
contracts containing arbitration clauses are per se procedurally unconscionable,
but usually that substantive unconscionability is also required to render the contract unenforceable. 143 There is something audacious in asserting that perhaps
99% of the contracts made in the United States are procedurally unconscionable
(or primafacie unenforceable). 144 Indeed, clearly, the courts are not so holding.
A business, moreover, should be able to decide the terms on which it will do business-and they normally do in many respects. 145 Consider, for example, a firm
that offers cars only with two-year limited warrantees. It offers the warrantee
term on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no negotiations allowed, and it does not
make extended warrantees available for an additional price. It would be absurd to
find that the contract or the warrantee term is procedurally unconscionable for this
reason. If the salesman does not mention the limited warrantee and the consumer
does not ask, there is no subjective consent to the specific clause when the consumer signs the contract so providing. Again, however, it would be absurd to
consider the contract procedurally unconscionable for this reason. Procedural
unconscionability
requires exceptional pressure by the stronger party against the
46
weaker one. 1

140. FARNSWORTH, supra note 72, at 534-35.
141. Rakoff, supranote 71, at 1176.
142. Id.; W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1971). See also KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
370(1960).
143. E.g., Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 669 (Ct. App. 2004); Flores v. Transamerica Homefirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 382 (Ct. App. 2001); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 138, 145-46 (Ct. App. 1997).
144. Slawson, supranote 142.
145. Employers typically set many conditions of employment, such as health insurance, life insurance, pension plans, noncompetitition agreements, on a take-it-or-leave it basis. David Sherwyn,
Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail To Fix the Problems Associated with Employment DiscriminationLaw Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.

1, 30 (2003); David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of MandatoryArbitrationof
Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructinga New Sink in
the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 146-47 (1999).
146. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability,
70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1264-65 (2003).
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Adhesion contracts containing arbitration clauses are being singled out from
the general run of adhesion contracts cases decided in recent years. 47 This is a
problem under Doctor's Associates:148 the FAA requires that arbitration agreements be treated on the same footing as other contracts. Laws treating them differently are preempted. 149 Evidently, the courts are hostile to arbitration because
they accord less respect to arbitration agreements in employment and consumer
contracts than to contracts generally.150 Such hostility is exactly what section 2 of
the FAA seeks to end. 151
Consider four cases. In one, the court holds that an arbitration agreement in
an adhesion contract is procedurally unconscionable (in part) because the arbitration clause was in fine print or otherwise inconspicuous. 152 This holding is inconsistent with Doctor's Associates. Even terms in fine print generally are enforced.1 53 In a second, the court finds procedural unconscionability because the
154
stronger party did not explain to the weaker party what rights it was forgoing.
Even when an employer gave an explanation, one court held that there was procedural unconscionability1 55 Again, this is incompatible with general contract law,
which imposes a duty on each party to read a contract and to seek legal advice if
necessary.' 56 Perhaps, even with an explanation, few consumers and employees
would understand the implications of agreeing to arbitration, or care when the
contract is made. In a fourth case, the court found procedural unconscionability
despite the fact that it was a post-dispute agreement, was not a contract of adhesion, and the weaker party was represented by counsel. This decision is almost
certainly unprecedented in contract and arbitration law. Even strong critics of
arbitration would enforce post-dispute arbitration agreements, and the presence of
a lawyer is significant.' 57 The courts' hostility to arbitration is clear. 58
147. Adhesion contracts are not enforced when they involve exclusions of remedies, exculpatory
clauses, and indemnity clauses. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 72 § 4.28, 4.29(a). The recent cases
considered in this Article strongly suggest that arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts are being
treated similarly as a new subcategory of all adhesion contracts. The former clauses, however, relieve
a party of all liability under a contract or for its torts. An arbitration clause, by contrast, provides an
alternate procedure for vindicating rights. The analogy is inadequate to save the arbitration cases
considered here.
148. See supra note 101.
149. Id.
150. See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003).
151. See supra notes 35-68 and accompanying text.
152. Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 900. (2003); Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7
Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 276 (Ct. App. 2003); Jaramillo v. JH Real Estate Partners, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 525,
535 (Ct. App. 2003); Fittante v. Palm Springs Motors, Inc., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 659, 671 (Ct. App.
2003); Palm Beach Motor Cars Ltd., Inc. v. Jeffries, 885 So. 2d 990, 992-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004);
E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 715 (Miss. 2002); see Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809
N.E.2d 1161 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
153. Exceptions are for warranty disclaimers under the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 2-316
(2004).
154. Voyager Life Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 353 F. Supp. 2d 748, 758 (S.D. Miss. 2005); D.R. Horton,
Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1164 (Nev. 2004).
155. Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, 341 F.3d 256, 272 (3d Cir. 2003).
156. Norwest Fin. Miss., Inc. v. McDonald, 905 So. 2d 1187, 1194 (Miss. 2005).
157. Carrington & Castle, supra note 11, at 218.
158. See Pardee Constr. Co. v. Super. Ct., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Ct. App. 2002); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1179 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (adhesion contracts have a weaker presumption in favor of arbitration than other contracts).
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In addition, many cases find procedural unconscionability because there were
no negotiations on the arbitrationclause,159 or that the weaker party had no alter6
native source for the employment or goods to be provided by the stronger party.'
There is, however, no requirement in general contract law that there be give-andtake in the negotiation of a contract or each clause of a contract. Requiring such a
negotiation defeats the value of form contracts, which require uniformity to serve
their many purposes.'61 It appears that these requirements are being imposed only
on arbitration agreements, in violation of Doctor's Associates. There is also no
requirement in general contract law that a contract be held unenforceable because
a weaker party had no alternative source of supply.1 62 Antitrust law is available to
address the problem of monopolies. Otherwise, there are usually competitive
alternatives. In any event, there is and should be no common law legal guarantee
that an employee can get a job, much less a particular job, or that a consumer can
buy a particular product. One case even held that an arbitration agreement was
procedurally unconscionable because a consumer had no choice but to agree to
arbitration if it was to borrow from the lender.163 The availability of other lenders
was not even considered.
2. Substantive Unconscionability
Even if one were to accept that arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts
are procedurally unconscionable per se, one must proceed to consider substantive
unconscionability. In almost all jurisdictions, both procedural and substantive
unconscionability are required to justify finding that a contract is unenforceable. 164
In the recent cases examined for this Article, the courts have given over twenty
different reasons for finding arbitration agreements substantively unconscionable
in an employment, consumer or similar case. For the reasons given below, it is
hard to resist the conclusion that many of these cases manifest a new judicial hostility to arbitration.
a. Costs and Fees
In arbitration, one party bears or both parties share the costs of the arbitration,
including the arbitrator's fee and any filing fee. It is possible to shift a winning
party's lawyer's fees to the losing party. The arbitration agreement may address
the question of costs and fees or, more often, the arbitrator may decide it. Unlike
civil litigation, there is no governmental revenue source to subsidize the proceed159. Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 669 (Ct. App. 2004); Abramson v. Juniper
Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 441 (Ct. App. 2004); see Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of
Ga., LLC, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (S.D. Ga. 2003); Villa Milano Homeowners Ass'n v. 11
Davorge, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 5-6 (Ct. App. 2000).
160. Patterson v. rTT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 1993). But see
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572-73 (App. Div. 1998).
161. See generally Rakoff, supra note 71.
162. But see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86-87 (N.J. 1960), a case that has
not been generally followed.
163. Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861 (W. Va. 1998); see Porpora v. Gatliff
Bldg. Co., 828 N.E.2d 1081, 1084-85 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
164. The exceptions are noted above at note 114.
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ing. The lesser cost of arbitration on the whole is due mainly to the absence of
pretrial motions and extensive discovery, and from lower lawyer's fees that result
from a streamlined procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that
prohibitively expensive fees may be grounds for invalidating an arbitration
agreement in a case involving a statute. 65 Some courts cite costs and fees as a
reason to hold that an arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable in
nonstatutory cases, too. 166 One court focused on the agreement's requirement that
the parties bear their own lawyer's fees. 167 Others found that the costs and fees
would be greater than the amount of a consumer's claim. 16 8 Another held that
sharing costs would discourage claimants from bringing claims. 169 While others
wrote simply that arbitration would be expensive, 17 and four more that arbitration
would be more expensive than a lawsuit. 17 1 Yet others have disapproved of imposing lawyers' fees on the losing party, 172 even when this is left up to the arbitrator, 173 and yet another held that74a consumer-claimant could not be required to pay
any part of the arbitrator's fee.1
Upon critical scrutiny, holding that these features render an arbitration
agreement substantively unconscionable is inconsistent with the policy favoring
arbitration. The high costs of litigating, notably attorney's fees and the costs of
pretrial motions and discovery, frequently discourage potential plaintiffs from
bringing claims in court. 175 These costs generally are cheaper in arbitration
though the parties must pay filing fees and the arbitrator's fee. There is no basis
176
for finding that arbitration, on the whole, is more expensive than litigation.
Accordingly, the costs rationale for finding unconscionability may be based on
false premises. In any event, this rationale fails to distinguish arbitration from
litigation while preferring litigation as a standard for judging arbitration agreements. Consequently, it is incompatible with the policy favoring arbitration.
An agreement that imposes costs and/or fees on the losing party may be conscionable, even if not the best arrangement. Such an agreement does not deter an
employee or consumer from bringing weak claims any more than it deters a re165. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000); see Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787, 795-97 (2005) (limiting costs and fees rationale to
statutory claims); Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 907-09 (2003).
166. Merely requiring a claimant to pay a filing fee he or she cannot afford has been held to be substantively unconscionable. Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 277-78 (Ct. App. 2003).
Of course, there are filing fees in court that sometimes exceed a potential plaintiff's ability to pay.
This holding also favors litigation over arbitration. But see Budnitz, supra note 3.
167. Parilla v. LAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2004).
168. Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Leonard v. Terminix Int'l
Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 539 (Ala. 2002); McNulty v. H&R Block, Inc., 843 A.2d 1267, 1273-74 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2004).
169. See O'Hare v. Mun. Res. Consultants, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 125-26 (Ct. App. 2003).
170. Irwin v. UBS Painewebber, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1108-09 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Lucas v. Cash
N Advance, Inc. (In re Lucas), 312 B.R. 407,412 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2004).
171. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003); Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 663, 671 (Ct. App. 2004); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 16 (Mont. 2002);
Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594, 602 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
172. Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
173. Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 331, 339 (2004).
174. Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862 (D. Or. 2002).
175. Demaine & Hensler, supra note 75, at 69.
176. See supra note 88.
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spondent from defending (i.e., not settling) on the basis of weak defenses. It is
fair in this basic respect. Several statutes, moreover, allow a court to award costs
and fees to the victorious party. 177 Foreign practice, as in England, routinely involves shifting lawyer's fees, 1 78 and respected scholars advocate fee shifting in the
United States. 179 True, an employer or seller may be better able to afford the costs
and fees. Consequently, some weaker employee and consumer claims may be
discouraged by the prospect, but again, the costs of litigation discourage plaintiffs,
too. The rationale does not distinguish arbitration from litigation while preferring
litigation. Consequently, it violates the policy favoring arbitration.
0 'Donoghue v. Smythe, Cramer Co. 180 illustrates a case in which a court
rightly found a costs provision unconscionable. The arbitration agreement limited
the claimant's recovery to $265. The minimum cost of the arbitration to the
claimant would have been a $500 arbitration filing fee.
In addition, it is easy to sever a provision providing for onerous costs and
fees, leaving the remaining questions to the arbitrator and the arbitration obligation intact.181 Most courts that rely on these reasons, however, do not consider
severance. Yet severance of an unconscionable term is permitted explicitly under
the standard formulations of the unconscionability doctrine. 182 Moreover, it
would seem to be required whenever possible by the policy favoring arbitration.
This should be an additional, independent, and sufficient reason to sever. By not
severing when it is possible, the courts strike down entire arbitration agreements
for inadequate reasons. The costs and fees seem a pretext for doing so. Hostility
to arbitration may be inferred.
b. ProceduralLimitations: Venue, Limitation Periods,Class Actions,
Consolidation,and Discovery
Many courts strike arbitration agreements because the procedure specified in
the agreement appears to them to be unfair to the employee or consumer, often
because arbitration would be less favorable than litigation. Again, when designing a procedure, the defendant/respondent's interests also should be taken into
177. Civil rights and other public interest legislation often includes a fee-shifting provision in order to
encourage legitimate assertion of the statutory rights. E.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000); CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 2006) ("Upon motion, a
court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any
action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest."); CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 91003(a), 91012 (West 2006) (allowing the award of attorney's fees in cases enforcing California's Political Reform Act).
178. E.g., Elaine A. Carlson, The New Texas Offer-of-Settlement Practice-TheNewest Steps in the
Tort Reform Dance, 46 S. TEx. L. REV. 733, 737 (2005); James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder,
Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. &
ECON. 225, 225 (1995); Edward F. Sherman, From "Loser Pays" to Modified Offer of Judgment
Rules: Reconciling Incentives To Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1863, 1863 (1998).
179. Hughes & Snyder, supranote 178; Sherman, supra note 178.
180. No. 80453, 2002 WL 1454074, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 2002).
181. Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int'l, 324 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003); Healy v. RBC Dain Rauscher, No. C
04-4873MMC, 2005 WL 387140, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2005); Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 130
Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 900-01 (Ct.App. 2003); McManus v. CIBC World Mkts. Corp., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d
446, 465 (Ct. App. 2003).
182. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); Armendariz
v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 773 (2000).
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Accuracy of results-not plaintiff/claimant's victories-should be the

goal. Five procedural elements stand out in the cases. The rationales offered
here, too, are questionable in light of the policy favoring arbitration.
First, some cases hold that it is substantively unconscionable for an agreement to require that the arbitration be located far from the employee's or consumer's home.' 83 Presumably, this discourages the weaker parties from bringing
claims. The same thing, however, is true in the litigation context. Parties normally are free to select their litigation forum by agreement, even in adhesion contracts. 184 There is no apparent reason why they should not be similarly free in
arbitration. Moreover, on this issue it is again permissible to sever an offending
clause from the remainder of the agreement.18 5 A location provision seems easy
to excise, 86 but some of these courts did not sever the location provision. Rather,
they refused to enforce the entire arbitration agreement.' 87 The courts might be
manifesting a pro-plaintiff bias, but (yet again) this in itself would be unjustified.
The location rationale, absent severance, would seem questionable enough to be
inconsistent with the policy favoring arbitration.
Second, some litigated arbitration agreements set short deadlines for filing
claims in arbitration-shorter than the applicable statute of limitations. Courts
have held arbitration agreements containing such deadlines to be substantively
unconscionable.' 8 8 The problem with these clauses is real, but they should not be
held unconscionable so as to destroy the entire arbitration agreement. The refusal
to enforce them should be based on the public policy underlying the relevant statute of limitations. On that basis, an offending deadline should be severed. 189 As
with the costs and location cases, impermissible limitations provisions do not
make the entire arbitration agreement unconscionable. The policy favoring arbitration would seem in such a case to mandate severance.
Third, class-wide arbitration generally is permissible. 90 Some arbitration
91
agreements, however, prohibit it and are, for this reason, held unconscionable.1

183. Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176-77 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Bolter v. Super. Ct., 104
Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 894-95 (Ct. App. 2001). Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d
563, 566 (Ct. App. 1993). But see Jones v. Genus Credit Mgmt. Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 598, 602 (D.

Md. 2005).
184. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591 (1991); Vega-Perez v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.P.R. 2005); Intershop Commc'ns v. Super. Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 847, 850
(Ct. App. 2002); William W. Park, Bridging the Gap in Forum Selection: Harmonizing Arbitration
and Court Selection, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (1998).

185. Bolter v. Super. Ct., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 896 (Ct. App. 2001); Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208(1) (1981).
186. Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); see Great Earth Cos.,
Inc. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 890-91 (6th Cir. 2002). These cases put severability on the ground that
it was the parties' intentions that the clause could be severed.
187. See Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165; Patterson,18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563.
188. Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2003). A ten day notice-ofclaim requirement was struck down in Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1046-47 (9th
Cir. 2001).
189. See Swain, 128 S.W.3d at 103.
190. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). See generally Joshua S. Upshutz,
745; U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2004); RESTATEMENT

Note, The Court's Implicit Roadmap: Charting the Prudent Course at the Juncture of Mandatory
ArbitrationAgreements and Class Action Lawsuits, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1677 (2005); Jean Sternlight, As
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1 (2000).
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This prohibition works to the disadvantage of very small claimants, whose claims
are not viable for arbitration unless combined with many others. In this respect,
arbitration within such an agreement would seem to be inferior to the litigation
192
alternative, especially when the claim may be brought in small claims court.
Again, though, such a comparison is beside the point due to the policy favoring
arbitration. Litigation does not set the standard. Rather, the question is whether
the prohibition makes out a "gross disparity in the values exchanged" 93-a contractual analysis of substantive unconscionability as permitted by section 2 of the
FAA. The parties should be free to trade off any discouragement of claims with
the advantages of arbitration.
Moreover, the basis for striking down this clause is the statute or procedural
rule allowing class actions. The clause therefore may violate public policy.
Again, the clause can be severed because its unconscionability, if any, does not
pervade the arbitration agreement. 194Failing to sever it, as some courts have, may
seize on a pretext to disfavor arbitration.
Fourth, at least one court has refused to enforce an arbitration agreement in
part due to a prohibition on consolidating claims. 195 In litigation, joinder may be
permissible or even mandatory. 196 Again, there is a difference between arbitration
and litigation. The comparison again is beside the point of a sound unconscionability analysis: litigation does not set the standard. In addition, consolidation
generally is not allowed in arbitration unless all parties agree to the same arbitration. 19 7 By prohibiting consolidation in an arbitration agreement, the stronger
party simply signals that it will not agree to a consolidated arbitration. 98 The
clause in effect exercises a right under the law: it does not disadvantage the
191. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003); Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 30 Cal. Rptr.
3d 76, 87 (2005); Whitney v. Alltel Commc'ns, Inc., 173 S.W. 3d 300, 309 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005).
But see Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 400 F.3d 868, 877-78 (Ga. 2005); Bischoff v.
DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND, 693
N.W.2d 918, 926-27 (N.D. 2005).
192. See generally Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 83. In AAA arbitration under its consumer rules,
the arbitration agreement cannot preclude recourse to a small claims court. Am. Arbitration Ass'n,
Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes, R. C-l(d) (effective Sept. 15, 2005), R. Cl(d), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014 (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
193. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
194. Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. SACV 03-130 DOC, 2003 WL 21530185, at *13 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 18, 2003).
195. Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175-76 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 19-20 (mandatory and permissive joinder, respectively).
197. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 210 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir.
2000); Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634, 642 (Ala. 2003). But see Jonathan R. Waldron,
Note, Resolving a Split: May Courts Order Consolidationof ArbitrationProceedingsAbsent Express
Agreement by the Parties?,2005 J. DiSP. RESOL. 177 (2005).
198. If the consolidation provision of California's arbitration statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3
(1982), is permissive, as it has been traditionally interpreted to be, the parties should be able to ban
consolidation in the arbitration agreement due to the state's policy manifested in the statute. See
Parker v. McCaw, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 55, 63 (Ct. App. 2005) ("A party may not avoid the terms of separately negotiated unambiguous contracts and rewrite them under the authority of California state arbitration procedures contained in section 1281.3.") (citations omitted). In Yuen v. Super. Ct., 18 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 127, 130 (Ct. App. 2004) the court judged consolidation to be an arbitrable issue of contract
interpretation. But see Indep. Ass'n of Mailbox Center Owners, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 659
(Ct. App. 2005) (ban on group arbitration in a contract of adhesion held to be unconscionable, and
therefore, unenforceable under § 1281.3).
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weaker party. Using a prohibition on consolidation to refuse enforcement of an
arbitration agreement seems like a thin pretext to hide an anti-arbitration bias.
Again, such a provision could be severed.
Fifth, some arbitration agreements limit discovery; for example, they may allow each party no more than two depositions.1 9 The absence of discovery or
limited discovery can be one of arbitration's virtues because it streamlines the
proceeding, reducing delay and costs. If enforced, however, a discovery limitation can work, for example, to the disadvantage of an employee asserting a claim
of discrimination under a civil rights statute. Consider such a claim based on a
statistical argument. 200 The employer will have possession of the relevant data.
For a claim of harassment, by contrast, the testimony of the employee may suffice.
Under Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,201 the discovery limit probably
need not be enforced when it denies an avenue for the effective vindication of
statutory rights. 20 2 In a non-statutory case, such as one for breach of contract by
2°3
discharging an employee without cause, effective vindication is not relevant.
No public policy underlying a statute is in play; the right in question is a private
right.2 04 Nonetheless, ideally, the extent of discovery should be decided by the
arbitrator in light of the shape of the case and the parties' arguments in order to
provide a fair hearing-not in the arbitration agreement ex ante. In some, but not
all, cases, a limit on discovery may be substantively unconscionable. 20 5 Yet again,
it can be severed.
c. UnilateralRights for the Stronger Party
Some cases strike down arbitration clauses because they allow the stronger
party to change the terms unilaterally. For example, a stronger party may be given
a right to modify the arbitration agreement. 2° 6 Similarly, it may provide for the
20 7
arbitrator to be selected by one party or from a list provided by one party.
Some of these limitations are substantively unconscionable. In particular, the
arbitrator surely should be a neutral. Allowing the stronger party to name the
arbitrator in the arbitration agreement, or to provide a list from which the arbitra199. Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 88, 97 (Ct. App. 2004).
200. See generally DAVID BALDUS, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980).
201. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
202. In Gilmer, discovery more limited than that allowed in federal courts was held not to preclude
arbitration of statutory rights. 500 U.S. at 31. See Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (2004).
203. See supra notes 130-139 and accompanying text.
204. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (distinguishing public
and private rights subject to arbitration).
205. In Fitz, the limitation on discovery to two depositions was subject to the power of the arbitrator
to allow more if it would otherwise be impossible to conduct a fair hearing. The court found this
inadequate to save the arbitration clause. 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (Ct. App. 2004). By contrast, in Martinez v. Master Protection Corp., the arbitration agreement limited discovery to one deposition and one
document request. The court held that this was not unconscionable. 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 672 (Ct.
App. 2004).
206. Ramsdell v. Lenscrafters, Inc., 135 Fed. Appx. 130, 131 (9th Cir. 2005); Aguillard v. Auction
Mgmt. Corp., 884 So. 2d 1257, 1261 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
207. McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2004); Murray v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2002); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips,
173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 614 (1981);
Burch v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 49 P.3d 647, 650-51 (Nev. 2002).
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tor must be chosen, so destroys the integrity of the arbitral proceeding as to
"shock the conscience."
A unilateral right to modify the arbitration agreement is subject to the legal
limitation that it must be exercised in good faith.2 °8 The arbitration agreement
confers discretion on the stronger party. This discretion must be exercised for a
reason that was reasonably expectable by the weaker party at the time of contract
formation. 20 9 The good faith limitation on discretion probably does what unconscionability cannot do: it requires the stronger party with a unilateral right to modify, establish, and maintain fair arbitral procedures. 210 Under this law, however,
the question cannot be decided on the basis of the initial arbitration agreementthe one containing the right to modify. It should be decided on the basis of the
agreement as modified by the stronger party. Only then can it be determined
whether the modification was made in good faith. On the whole, however, though
these decisions ignore the good faith check, it cannot be said that they exhibit
hostility to arbitration.
d. Substantive Limitations
Some courts have seized upon substantive limitations on the arbitrators, contained in the arbitration clause, as reasons to strike down the arbitration agreement. In some cases, the arbitration agreement limited the remedy the arbitrator
could award, excluding consequential or punitive damages. 211 In one, the agree212
ment imposed a penalty on the weaker party for failing to arbitrate a claim.
These are substantive matters. They have nothing to do with the arbitration procedure. Limiting a remedy is allowable under contract law because the law of
contract remedies generally consists of default rules. It is even permissible under
statutes such as RICO. 213 The substantive question may turn on whether the remedy as limited fails of its essential purpose or is an unconscionable term.214
Unless it does, the limitation is effective in litigation as well as arbitration. It
therefore is not a valid reason to strike an arbitration agreement.
A disallowed limitation on the remedy should result in striking the limitation
from the contract, as in litigation, not in refusing to enforce the entire arbitration
agreement, as the courts did in these cases. A penalty for not arbitrating is unenforceable under general contract law principles prohibiting agreed damages that
are penalties.215 Again, it is not enforceable in court, either. It therefore is not a
valid reason to strike an arbitration agreement. In the penalty cases in courts,
moreover, the penalty clause is stricken from the contract, which is otherwise
208. Hooters, 173 F.3d at 938; see Battels v. Sears Nat'il Bank, 365 F.Supp.2d 1205 (M.D. Ala.
2005); see also Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 284-85 (Ct. App. 1998).
209. See generally STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERsEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAnH:
FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH AND ENFORCEMENT (1995).

210. Hooters, 173 F.3d at 938.
211. Leonard v. Terminix Int'l. Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 538 (Ala. 2002); Pardee Constr. Co. v. Super.
Ct., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 295-96 (Ct. App. 2002); W. Va. ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265,
275-76 (W. Va. 2002); see Harper v. Ultimo, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418,423 (Ct. App. 2003).
212. D.R. Horton v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1165 (Nev. 2004).
213. PacifiCc.are Health Sys, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401,405-06 (2003).
214. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-719 (2004).
215. Farnsworth, supra note 72.
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enforceable.2 16 Striking down an entire arbitration clause due to the inclusion of
such a clause is not justified under general contract law. It, too, is a pretext.
e. Miscellaneous Reasons
There are other reasons courts have given that do not fall into one of the
above categories. Several, nonetheless, are suspect.
In one case, the arbitration agreement provided that an employee was required to submit its case to the employer as a condition precedent to arbitrating.
The court held that this gave the employer an unfair "peek" and rendered the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable.217 The court could have severed
the condition precedent without upsetting the balance in the arbitration agreement,
but it did not. More important, the employer may have had a legitimate business
need for such a condition. Making the case to the employer before starting an
adversarial proceeding permits the employer (a) to concede and take corrective or
compensatory action, (b) to propose noncompulsory methods of alternative dispute settlement, such as mediation,218 or (c) to enter into direct settlement negotiations. Any of these events could maintain the relationship between the two parties, which might save the employee from finding another job and the employer
from finding another employee. By not examining the plausible justifications for
the condition, the court may be reaching its conclusion without due regard for
contract law and the policy favoring arbitration.
A few other courts have been more straightforward about their prejudice.
Thus, one announced that negligence claims covered by the arbitration agreement
were better decided by a jury.
Another held that arbitration agreements in employment contracts are presumptively substantively unconscionable. 220 And a
third will not find an arbitration agreement enforceable unless it was concluded in
a "clear and unmistakable manner," 221 another limitation not found in general
contract law and inconsistent with Allied-Bruce.
f

Cumulative Effects

Most cases examined for this study do not find unconscionability for one and
only one of the above reasons. Two or more reasons are usually given. Consequently, it should be considered whether the cumulative effect of several of the
above reasons can make an arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable
when any one of the reasons does not suffice. The short answer is that, logically,

216. Id.
217. Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 307-08 (Ct. App. 2004).
218. However, one court has held that a requirement of mediation before arbitration is substantively
unconscionable. Garrett v. Hooters-Toledo, 295 F. Supp. 2d 774, 782-83 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
219. Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
220. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003). This decision may be
inconsistent with Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (FAA and its policy favoring arbitration applies to employment contracts involving commerce except for those of transportation
workers).
221. Quiles v. Fin. Exch. Co., 879 A.2d 281, 287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
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the whole cannot be greater than its parts. Cumulating a number of invalid reasons cannot make out a valid reason.
It is a different question, however, whether a court can cumulate a number of
valid reasons, each of which alone may have inadequate weight to tip the scales in
favor of a finding of unconscionability. The above discussion distinguishes valid
from invalid reasons, not weightier from less weighty reasons. Consequently, it
would seem, many of the decisions cited were erroneous under the law and established policy.
V. CONCLUSION
There is a new judicial hostility to arbitration in noncommercial cases. Many
courts, when asked to enforce an arbitration agreement, seize upon the unconscionability doctrine as a pretext to refuse enforcement. The dispute then goes to
litigation despite the parties' agreement to arbitrate. By refusing to compel arbitration under a valid agreement, the courts manifestly prefer litigation to arbitration. This violates the policy favoring arbitration, which is based in section 2 of
the FAA and several Supreme Court precedents. The reasons for such refusals
should be preempted under these precedents.
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